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CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS AND AGENCY 
G. W. KEETON 
THE extent to which agents, acting on behalf of trustees, may in­
cur personal responsibility as constructive trustees and so be­
come accountable to the beneficiaries, has produced an exten­
sive case law and some interesting distinctions, often turning 
upon the facts of the individual case, and the nature and extent of 
the agent's participation in the acts which are impeached. In the 
leading case of Barnes v. Addy,1 decided a century ago, a sole 
trustee had been appointed against the advice of a solicitor and 
the sole trustee misapplied the funds. Two solicitors who had 
prepared the deeds in the transaction in which the funds had been 
misapplied and who had received their costs were joined as de­
fendants in a suit by two beneficiaries, along with the sole trus­
tee. The Vice-Chancellor dismissed the bill against the two soli­
citors, and his decree was affirmed on appeal. In the course of his
judgment on the appeal, Lord Selbome L.C. said: 2 
'Now in this case we have to deal with certain persons who 
are trustees, and with certain other persons who are not trus­
tees. That is a distinction to be borne in mind throughout the 
case. Those who create a trust clothe the trustee with a legal 
power and control over the trust property, imposing on him a 
corresponding responsibility. That responsibility may no doubt 
be extended in equity to others who are not properly trustees, if 
they are found either making themselves trustees de son tort, or 
actually participating in any fraudulent conduct of the trustee to 
the injury of the cestui que trust. But, on the other hand, stran­
gers are not to be made constructive trustees merely because 
they act as the agents of trustees in transactions within their 
legal powers, transactions, perhaps of which a Court of Equity 
may disapprove, unless those agents receive and become charge­
able with some part of the trust property, or unless they assist 
1 
( 187 4) 9 Ch. App. 244. 
2 at pp. 251-25 3. 
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with knowledge in a dishonest and fraudulent design on the 
part of the trustees. Those are the principles, as it seems to me, 
which we must bear in mind in dealing with the facts of this 
case. If those principles were disregarded, I know not how 
anyone could, in transactions admitting of doubt as to the view 
which a Court of Equity might take of them, safely discharge 
the office of solicitor, of banker, or of agent of any sort to trus-
tees. But, on the other hand, if persons dealing honestly as 
agents are at liberty to rely on the legal power of the trustees, 
and are not to have the character of trustees constructively im­
posed upon them, then the transactions of mankind can safely 
be carried through; and I apprehend those who create trusts do 
expressly intend, in the absence of fraud and di shone sty, to ex­
onerate such agents of all classes from the responsibilities 
which are expressly incumbent, by reason of the fiduciary rela­
tion, upon the trustees.' 
These observations are the foundation of two ·paragraphs in 
H alsbury' s L aws of England,3 which have been frequently cited in 
cases involving the position of agents as constructive trustees. 
Two cases decided in 1968 illustrate the circumstances in which 
constructive trusteeship may be attributed to an agent. The first 
considered transactions in which the agents were bankers, the 
second considered transactions involving the solicitors of a foun­
dation. 
The first case, Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd. v. Cradock 
( No. 3)4 is notable for the full consideration by Ungoed-Thomas J. 
of the position of bankers who act on behalf of trustees or other 
fiduciaries. It was established in Foley v. Hill5 and reaffirmed by 
Lord Hatherley L.C. in Burdick v. Garrick6 that a banker is not a 
trustee for a customer of the amount standing to his credit in his 
bank account, and this has been continuously acted upon sub­
sequently. The relationship between banker and customer, as 
Ungoed-Thomas J. pointed out in the instant case, is contractual, 
and it is founded on one contract, which normally includes the 
relationship of creditor and debtor with regard to the balance in 
the customer's bank account and the relationship of principal and 
agent in respect of the payment of the customer's cheques drawn 
on the customer's bank account. It was more extensively discussed 
3 Vol. 38, paras.1449-1450, pp.860-861. 
4 [1968] 1 W.L.R. 1555. 
5 ( 1848) 2 H.L. Cas. 28.
6 
( 1870) 5 Ch. App. 23 3. 
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by Atkin L.J. in his well-known judgment in J oachimson v. Swiss 
Bank Corporation. 1 The customer on his part undertakes to exer­
cise reasonable care in executing his written orders so as not to 
mislead the bank or to facilitate a forgery. In addition, as both 
Atkins L.J. and Bankes L.J. pointed out in Hilton v. Westminster 
Bank Ltd, 8 it is the duty of the bank to exercise reasonable care 
and skill in dealing with the customer's business. 
It is evident from this that there is no place for the inclusion of 
a constructive trust in the ordinary relations of banker and cus­
tomer. For this to exist, there must be some additional factor, of 
the kind discussed by Lord Selborne in Barnes v. Addy.9 In the 
Selangor Estates Case, Ungoed-Thomas J. pointed out that there 
were two very different kinds of constructive trustees, and he 
lucidly explained the difference between them: 
<(l) Those who, though not appointed trustees, take upon 
themselves to act as such and to possess and administer trust 
property for the beneficiaries, such as trustees de son tort. 
Distinguishing features for present purposes are (a) they do not 
claim 'to act in their own right but for the beneficiaries, and 
(b) their assumption to act is not of itself a ground of liability
(save in the sense of course of liability to account and for any
failure in the duty so assumed), and so their status as trustees
precedes the occurrence which may be the subject of claim
against them. (2) Those whom a court of equity will treat as
trustees by reason of fheir action, of which complaint is made.
Distinguishing features are (a)  that such trustees claim to act
in their own right and not for beneficiaries, and (b) no trustee­
ship arises before, but only by reason of, the action complained
of.
Until the limitation provisions of the Trustee Act, 1925, 10 the
first category of constructive trustees could not rely, in de­
fence of claims against them, on statutory limitation or the 
analogous rules enforced by courts of equity. This was because 
they acted as trustees for others, and therefore held in right of 
those others and therefore time was held not to run in their fa­
vour against those others. But as the second category of ttus-
7 [1921] 3 K.B. 110, 126-7. 
8( 1926) 135 L. T. 358, 362. Reversed in the House of Lords, but not on
this point 43 T.L.R. 124. 
9 
supra. 
10It would seem that Ungoed-Thomas J. is referring to the provisions of
the Limita t ion Act� 1939, not to the Trustee Act ,  192 5. 
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tees claimed in their own right, time ran in their favour from 
their obtaining possession. It is largely by reason of this dis­
tinction that the first category of constructive trustee is some­
times referred to or included in the authorities under the tenn 
"express trustee" ... ' 
The second part of these observations is founded upon the 
opinions of the Privy Council, as expressed in the Canadian case 
of Taylor v. Davies, 11 when it was stated: 
'The po ssession of an express trustee was treated by the 
Courts as the possession of his cestuis que trustent, and accor­
dingly time did not run in his favour against them. This disab­
ility applied, not only to a trustee named as such in the instru­
ment of trust, but to a person who, though not so named, had as­
sumed the position of a trustee for others or had taken posses­
sion or control of property on their behalf ... These persons, 
though not originally trustees, had taken upon themselves the 
custody and administration of property on behalf of others; and 
though sometimes referred to as constructive trustees, they 
were, in fact, actual trustees, though not so named. It fol ­
lowed that their possession also was treated as the possession 
of the persons for whom they acted, and they, like express 
trustees, were disabled from taking advantage of the time bar.' 
The Privy Council went on to point out that the position of 
these trustees was quite different from that of constructive trus­
tees in the narrower sense. These were the constructive trusts 
discussed by Lord Esher M.R. and Bowen L.J. in Soar v. Ash­
well. 12 In the course of his judgment in this case Lord Esher 
says: 
'If the breach of the legal relation relied on, whether such 
breach be by way of tort or contract, makes, in the view of a 
Court of Equity, the defendant a trustee for the plaintiff, the 
Court of Equity treats the defendant as a trustee become so· by 
construction, and the trust is called a constructive trust; and 
against the breach which by construction creates the trust the 
Court of Equity allows Statutes of Limitation to be vouched.' 
In the Selangor Case the claim by a liquidator of the company 
against the banks could only be made in respect of the second 
class of constructive trusts. The case against the two banks, the 
11 [1920] A.C. 636, 650-651.
1
2 (1893] 2 Q.B. 390. 
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District Bank and the Bank of Nova Scotia, rested upon the extent 
of their participation in the operations of the directors of the 
Selangor company, in respect of which the directors were held 
accountable, as being in breach of trust. So far as the District 
Bank was concerned, Cradock, who bought a controlling interest 
in the company, had a small account at its branch in Oxford Street, 
and he told the manager and deputy manager of the branch that he 
could influence the transfer of the Selangor account to the branch, 
in view of his interest in the company. It was this circumstance 
which induced the manager, McMinn, and assistant manager, Rey­
nolds, to arrange a Banker's draft for £195,322.5s.2d. to Contanglo 
which conducted banking business for Cradock, in exchange for a 
banker's draft from the Bank of Nova Scotia for £233,000, drawn 
on Selangor' s account at that bank. 
At a meeting on April 25  1958, Cradock explained to Reynolds 
that the Selangor account would be transferred to the District 
Bank and that Selangor would draw a cheque on District for 
£232,500 in favour of the Woodstock Trust (also controlled by 
Cradock) · as a loan. This cheque would be endorsed by Woodstock 
as a loan by the Woodstock Trust in favour of Cradock, also as a 
loan. This cheque was then paid into Cradock' s account at the 
District Bank, and Reynolds parted with the cheque for £195,000 
in favour of Contanglo. By this means the Selangor account was 
stripped of its assets, an operation which had been facilitated by 
the failure of the manager and assistant manager of the District 
Bank to make any inquiries, either at the time when the funds 
were transferred, or later when 79 per cent of the Selangor stock 
was registered in one of the District Bank's nominee companies 
as nominee for Cradock. 
The liquidator's claim against the District Bank was therefore 
that it should, as a constructive trustee, replace the £232,500 of 
the plaintiff's a ·oney with interest at five per cent, which had 
been paid in furtherance of an ao:angement which gave financial 
assistance to Cradock for the purchase of the Selangor stock, and 
which was therefore not used for the purposes of the company. 
There was a further claim against the Bank for damages for negli­
gence in the performance of the duty which they owed to Selangor 
as their customer, in honouring a cheque for £232,500 drawn on 
Selangor, and debiting it to ·the Selangor account, without making 
any inquiry of Cradock and his associates of the purpose for 
which the £232,500 was being paid to Cradock, by a cheque in 
favour of the Woodstock Trust, which that trust in tum endorsed 
to Cradock. 
63 
To decide whether this claim was entitled to succeed involved 
a detailed examination of the extent of the participation of the 
manager and assistant manager of the District Bank in the wrong­
ful activities of Cradock and his associates, and of their knowl­
edge and understanding of them. It will be seen that their conduct 
required to be measured by the standards of nonnal banking prac­
tice in relation to the accounts of customers, and Ungoed-Thomas 
J. made a full examination of the decisions on this point, and he
observed: 1 3  
'The standard of that reasonable care and skill 1 4  is an obj ec­
tive standard applicable to bankers. Whether or not it has been 
attained in any particular case has to be decided in the light of 
all the relevant facts, which can vary almost 1nfinitely. The 
relevant considerations include the prima facie assumption that 
men are honest, the practice of bankers, the very limited time 
in which banks have to decide what course to take with regard 
to a cheque presented for payment without risking liability for 
delay, and the extent to which an operation is unusual or out of 
the ordinary course of business. An operation which is reason­
ably consonant with the normal conduct of business (such as 
payment by a stockbroker into his account of proceeds of sale 
of his client's shares) of necessity does not suggest that it is 
out of the ordinary course of business. If "reasonable care and 
skill" is brought to the consideration of such an operation, it 
clearly d oes not call for any intervention by the bank. What 
intervention is appropriate in that exercise of reasonable care 
and skill again depends on circumstances. Where it is to in­
quire, then failure to make inquiry is not excused by the con­
viction that the inquiry would be futile, or that the answer would 
be false.' 
Judged by these standards the bank was held to be liable be­
cause it paid the Woodstock cheque out of the Selangor account 
in circumstances known to the bank before payment and in which a 
reasonable banker would have concluded that the payment was to· 
finance the purchase by Cradock of the Selangor stock - although 
neither McMinn nor Reynolds realised that the payment was being 
used for this purpose. In the judge's view the bank had failed to 
exercise reasonable care in what was plainly an exceptional and 
13 at p. 1608. 
14 i.e. as defined by Atkin L.J. and Bankes L.J. in Hilton v. Westminste,r
Bank Ltd. supra. 
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very substantial transaction. 'For my part,' he added, 15 'I can see 
no substantial difficulty in banks providing against such excep­
tional transactions, involving substantial amounts, as in this case, 
being carried through by officials completely inexperienced in such 
transactions and unqualified to deal with them. If a bank allows 
such officials to conduct such busines.s it is asking for the kind 
of trouble which it has got in this case.' 
The claim against the Bank of Nova Scotia arose from a distinct, 
but connected transaction. It was a claim against them as con­
structive trustees to replace £249,500 with interest at five per 
cent, and for damages for negligence in the performance of their 
duty as the bankers of Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd. So far 
as the constructive trust was concerned, the claim was based, not 
on actual knowledge, bu·t on knowledge which the bank would have 
had if it had made the inquiries which it was its duty to make. In 
equity, it was argued, the bank was liable to the same extent as 
it would have been if it had made proper inquiries and had obtained 
honest answers. In each case, the standard of care was that of a 
reasonable banker. 
In thi�_ case, the claim against the Nova Scotia Bank failed as 
it was able to show that it had exercised such a degree of care. 
The Selangor Company had an account at the defendant bank, and 
the company's secretary and chairman, Burden and Sinclair, had a 
mandate to issue cheques on it, following resolutions of the com­
pany's board of directors. Very shortly after the mandate had been 
given, a cheque for £207,500 was drawn on the company's account, 
and was paid into Burden's account, and Burden drew a cheque for 
the same amount from his account in favour of Cradock. At a n  
interview with an official of the bank, it was explained that the 
cheques were being exchanged for 'internal accounting reasons', 
or 'internal ·book-keeping reasons'. A second cheque for £42,000, 
also on the company's account and also in favour of Burden, was 
drawn shortly afterwards. Ungoed-Thomas J. held that in the light 
of all the circumstances, there was nothing which put the bank 
upon a further inquiry, and therefore the bank was not liable , 
either in negligence or as a constructive trustee. The difference 
in the position of the two banks therefore turns upon the degree of 
caution with which they approached these unusual transactions. 
Another case in 1968, Quistclose Investments Ltd. v. Rolls 
Raz or Ltd., 16 illustrates a further aspect of the relationship of
15 at p. 16 34.
16 (1968] Ch. 540; (1970] A.C. 567 (H.L.). 
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banker and customer from the standpoint of the law of trusts. At a 
time when Rolls Razor Ltd. was in serious difficulties, and had a 
large overdraft with Barclays Bank Ltd., the company obtained a 
loan of £209,719.8s.6d from Quistclose Investments on the agreed 
condition that it was used only for the purpose of paying a divi­
dend which had been declared shortly before. A cheque for the 
amount was received and was paid into a special No. 4 account at 
the bank, and a letter from the company to the bank stated that it
would only be used for the purpose of paying the dividend. Before 
the dividend was paid, the company went into liquidation so that 
no dividend could be paid. Quistclose therefore brought an action, 
claiming that Rolls Razor Ltd. held the money on trust to pay the 
dividend, and that, as that trust had failed, the company-held this 
sum on a resulting trust for Quistclose, and further that as the 
bank had notice of the purpose for which the money had been ad­
vanced the bank held it as a constructive trustee for Quistclose, 
and therefore could not use it as a set-off against the firm's over­
draft. Both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords accepted 
the claim of Quistclose Ltd., and held that the bank, who had re­
ceived the money with knowledge of the trust, must account for it
to Quistclose Ltd. 
The basis of the decision in the Quistclose case was that the 
money had been paid to the bank for a particular purpose, and not 
for any other, and it was therefore impressed with a trust in the 
hands of the bank to carry out that purpose. A similar result fol­
lowed in Re Kay ford Ltd., 17 a case in which the company was in 
process of liquidation. It was a mail order firm, which got into 
difficulties in 1972. At this point the company was advised by its 
accountants to open a separate bank account to be called the 
'Customers' Trust Deposit Account', and to pay into it moneys 
received from the customers for goods not delivered, so that if the 
company went into liquidation, these moneys could be refunded to 
customers who had not received their goods. The company ac­
cepted this advice, but paid the money into a donnant deposit 
account. Megarry J. held that these moneys were impressed with a 
trust for the unsatisfied customers. After referring to the case of 
Re N anwa Gold Mines Ltd., 18 in which money was sent on the 
faith of a promise to keep it in a separate account, he added that 
there was nothing in that case, or in any other, which made the 
existence of a separate account essential. The advice was to 
17 [1975) 1 W.L.R. 279. 
18 [1955) 1 W.L.R. 1080. 
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establish a trust account at the bank, and the whole purpose of it 
was to ensure that the moneys remained in the beneficial owner­
ship of those who sent them. 
'No doubt the general rule is that if you send money to a com­
pany for goods which are not delivered, you are merely a credi­
tor of the company unless a trust has been created. The sender 
may create a trust by using appropriate words when he sends 
the money (though I wonder how many do this, even if they are 
equity lawyers), or the company may do it by taking suitable 
steps on or before receiving the money. If either is done, the 
obligations in respect of the money are transformed from con­
tract to property, from debt to trust.' 
Later in his judgment, he added a general suggestion that when 
money is paid in advance to a company for future goods or ser­
vices, it is a proper thing for the company to do to pay it into a 
separate account wherever there is a doubt that the company will 
be able to fulfil its obligations. 
In another case arising at this period involving the position of 
an agent as constructive trustee, Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Herbert 
Smith & Co., 19 Edmund Davies L.J. in the Court of Appeal dis­
cussed the meaning of the tenn 'constructive trust'. He began by 
citing the meaning attributed to it in the American Restatement on 
Re sci tution: 20 
'Where a person holding title to property is subject to an 
equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground that he 
would be unjustly enriched if he were pennitted to retain it, 
a constructive trust arises.' 
Continuing, he pointed out that there was no clear definition of 
the concept in English law, that its boundaries had been left 
vague, and that personal advantage was not a sine qua non. By 
way of illustration he cited Nelson v. L arholt. 21 In that case, 
over a period of time an executor fraudulently drew eight cheques 
in favour of defendant on the banking account of the testator's 
estate. They amounted to £135, and the executor received this 
sum in cash from the defendant. The beneficiaries of the estate 
sued the defendant for the £135, on the grounds that he was a 
trustee of this sum for them. The defendant had received the 
cheques for value, and in good faith. Denning J. held that for the 
19 (1969] 2 Ch. 276. 
20 (1st Ed., 1937) para. 160, p. 640. 
21 (1948] 1 K.B. 339. 
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defendant to escape liability it was necessary that he should have 
received the cheques without notice of the executor's want of 
authority, and on the evidence it appeared that he either knew or 
ought to have known of this. Denning J. explained the position in 
the following way: 22 
'The relevant legal princi ples have been much developed in 
the last thirty-five years. A man's money is property which is 
protected by law. It may exist in various forms, such as coins, 
treasury notes, cash at bank, or cheques, or bills of exchange 
of which he is "the holder" but, whatever its form, it is protec­
ted according to one uniform principle. If it is taken from the 
rightful owner, or, indeed, from the beneficial owner, without 
his authority, he can recover the amount from any person into 
whose hands it can be traced, unless and until it reaches one 
who receives it in good faith and for value and without notice 
of the want of authority. Even if the one who received it acted 
in good faith, nevertheless if he had notice - that is, if he 
knew of the want of authority or is to be taken to have known of 
it - he must repay. All the cases that occur in the books, of
trustees or agents who draw cheques on the trust account or the 
principal' s account for their own private purposes, or of direc­
tors who apply their company's cheques for their own account, 
fall within this one principle. The rightful owner can recover 
the amount from anyone who takes the money with notice, sub­
ject, of course, to the limitation that he cannot recover twice 
over. This principle has been evolved by the courts of law and 
equity side by side. In equity it took the form of an action to 
follow moneys impressed with an express trust, or with a con­
structive trust owing to a fiduciary relationshi p. In law i t  took 
the form of an action for money had and received or damages 
for conversion of a cheque. It is no longer appropriate, how­
ever, to draw a distinction between law and equity. Principles 
have now to be stated in the light of their combined effect. Nor 
is it necessary to canvass the niceties of the old forms of ac­
tion. Remedies now depend on the substance of the right, not on 
whether they can be fitted into a particular framework. The 
right here is not peculiar to equity or contract or tort, but falls 
naturally within the important category of cases where the court 
orders restituti on, if the justice of the case so requires.' 
This principle was applied by Danckwerts J. in G.L. Baker Ltd. 
22 at pp. 342-3. 
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v. Medway Building and Supplies Ltd., 23 in a case in which a
company had entnisted to their auditor sums amounting to £80,000.
The auditor paid it into his bank account, and used part of it for
his own purposes, paying cheques to the defendants (of which he
was a director) in breach of trust. The plaintiffs claimed that
these sums were traceable in equity, since they had been wrong­
fully paid to them. The defendants denied that they were construe­
ti ve trustees of these sums, but Danckwerts J. gave judgment for
the plainciff s, subject to the possibility that the claim might be
defeated by the Limitation Act 1939. In order to defeat the claim,
said the judge, the defendant company must show that they re­
ceived the money in good faith and for value, and without notice
of the auditor's want of authority; and this they were unable to do.
There was an appeal from the judgment of Danckwerts J., but
solely on questions of procedure, but Willmer L.J. pointed out in
the Court of Appeal that Denning J.' s dictum was not in fact ne­
cessary for the decision of the case.
In the Carl Zeiss Stiftung Case, Edmund Davies L.J. pointed 
out that the concept of unjust enrichment was one example among 
the cases in which a constructive trust has been held to exist, 
and he added:24 
'It may be objected that, even assuming the correctness of 
the foregoing, it provides no assistance, inasmuch as reference 
to "unjust enrichment," "want of probity" and "the demands of 
justice and good conscience" merely introduces vague concepts 
which are in tum incapable of definition and which therefore 
provide no yardstick, I do not agree. Concepts may defy defini­
tion and yet the presence in or absence from a situation of that 
which they denote may be beyond doubt. The concept of "want 
of probity" appears to provide a useful touchstone in consider­
ing circumstances said to give rise to constructive trusts, and I 
have not found it misleading when applying it to many authori­
ties cited to this court. It is because of such a concept that 
evidence as to "good faith," "knowledge" and •notice" plays so 
important a part in the reported decisions. It is true that not 
every situation where probity is lacking gives rise to a con­
structive trust. Nevertheless, the authorities appear to show 
that nothing short of it will do. Not even gross negligence will 
suffice.' 
As an illustration of the last proportion, the learned Lord 




Justice cited Williams v. Williams25 and Re Blundell. 26 
The Carl Zei'ss Stiftung Case was of very great importance for, 
as Sachs L.J. said at the beginning of his judgment: 27 
'A claim of the nature made in the present case is well cal­
culated to suspend a sword of Damocles over the head of a 
solicitor acting for a client bona fide seeking to defend his 
title to property of which he is in possession and which con­
stitutes the bulk, and perhaps the entirety, of his assets.' 
The ac tion arose out of protracted proceedings between two 
German foundations, an East German foundation and a West Ger­
man foundation, both known as the Carl Zeiss Sciftung. The plain­
tiffs, the East German foundation, claimed to be the original foun­
dation, established in Jena in East Germany, and the defendants 
were solicitors acting for the West German foundation at Heiden­
heim in Wurtemburg, after the Russians had occupied East Ger­
many. The main action between the two foundations was initiated 
in October 1955, and the proceedings were still in progress. The 
East German foundation was claiming from the West German foun­
dation a declaration that its entire property and business belonged 
to the East German foundation, and also an account of all moneys 
arising from all dealings with that property. 
The present action was a claim against the solicitors of the 
West German foundation for all fees and costs paid to them, as 
being the money of the East German foundation, and therefore held 
on trust for the foundation. The plaintiffs argued that by reason of 
acting for the West German foundation, the defendants knew all 
the facts and matters in the claim against the foundation, and 
therefore that the money so paid belonged to the plaintiffs. On 
this, Sachs L.J. commented: 28 
'If the plaintiffs succeed in their contention the result will be 
that the defendant solicitors could not safely make use of any of 
the moneys thus received b y  them until there had been deter­
mined the main action by what may well be in due course a deci­
sion of the House of Lords. In this way one might say that the 
moneys in question would be "frozen".' 
The solicitors, as the professional advisers of the West German 
foundation, had given value for their services, but it was arguable 
that, even so, if they received notice that the property was sub-
25 ( 1881) 17 Ch. D. 437, 445.
26 (1888) 40 Ch.D. 370,381. 
27 at pp. 293-4.
28 at p. 294. 
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ject to a subsisting trust, they become constructive trustees of it. 
Knowledge of a claim is, however, not knowledge of the existence 
of a trust. In the words of Danckwerts L.J. : 29 
'Mr. Harman's contention was that the defendant solicitors 
knew where the moneys that they received came from and 
knew that the source was trust funds. In my view this conten­
tion fails at the outset. What the defendant solicitors knew was 
that the moneys came from the West German foundation and they 
knew of the allegations contained in the procee_dings brought 
against that foundation by the plaintiffs in which they were 
instructed to act as solicitors for the West Gennan foundation. 
They knew that claims were being made against the West 
German foundation that all their property and assets belonged to 
the plaintiffs or were held on trust for them. But claims are not 
the same thing as facts. Mr. Harman contended that for the pur­
poses of the present issue all the allegations contained in the 
statements of claim in both the actions must be taken as true. 
That will not do. What we have to deal with is the state of the 
defendant solicitors' knowledge (actual or imputed) at the date 
when they received payments of their costs and disbursements. 
At that date they cannot have had more than knowledge of the 
claims above mentioned. It was not possible for them to know 
whether they were well-founded or not. The claims depended 
upon most complicated facts still to be proved or disproved, and 
very difficult questions of German and English law. It is not a 
case where the West German foundation were holding property 
upon any express trust. They were denying the existence of any 
trust or any right of property in the assets claimed by the plain­
tiffs. Why should the solicitors of the West German foundation 
assume anything against their clients?' 
At the conclusion of his judgment, Edmund Davies L.J. adopted 
the submissions of counsel for the defendants, derived from the 
numerous cases, upon the liability of an agent as a constructive 
trustee.
30 
'(A). A solicitor or other agent who receives money from his 
principal which belongs at law or in equity to a third party is 
not accountable as a con strucci ve trustee to that third party 
unless he has been guilty of some wrongful act in relation to 
that money. (B). To act "wrongfully• he must be guilty of 
(i) knowingly participating in a breach of trust by his principal;
29 at p. l9 3. 
30 pp. 30 3-4. 
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or (ii) intermeddling with the trust property otherwise than 
merely as an agent and thereby becomes a trustee de son tort; or 
(iii) receiving or dealing with the money knowing that hj s prin­
cipal has no right to pay it over or to instruct him to deal with
it in the manner indicated; or (iv) some dishonest act relating
to the money.'
The important point of general application decided in this case 
is that mere notice of a claim asserted by a third party is insuf­
ficient to render an agent guilty of a wrongful act in dealing with 
property derived from his principal in accordance with the prin­
cipal' s instructions, unless the agent knows that the third party's 
claim is well-founded and that the principal therefore had no au­
thority to give the instructions; to which it should be added that if 
the agent is under a duty to inquire into the validity of the third 
party's claim, and where, although the inquiry would have estab­
lished that the claim is well-founded, no inquiry is made, the 
agent will be liable. In the Carl Zeiss Stiftung Case no such duty 
to inquire existed, since as Danckwerts L .J. pointed out the de­
termination whether the claim was well-founded depended upon 
decisions upon matters of law, which could only be made by a 
court. 
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